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Abstract
Aprion knowledge of failure modes of a system is
an indispensable information for design of robust
decentralized hierarchical control schemes. In
particular inclusion of system faults as part of the
process under control provides greater flexibility
for self diagnosis and maintenance of real-time
systems. By assigning discrete states to the
an "artificial
process under control,
consciousness" can be created within the
controller which allows the controller to exercise
selective actions for each given discrete state. This
concept has been implemented to control the
utility systems of the Space Station Laboratory
Simulator.

fault management, which could not have been
implemented without the recent advances in
hardware and software technology. Although the
concept of state machines [2] is very mature and it
has been successfully utilized for design of digital
computers, only recently researchers are
beginning to apply the technique directly to
process control (i.e no conversion of state
diagrams to sequential codes by a programmer,
which itself results in software faults and thus
defeats the purpose).
The environment that this state machine can be
realized is described next.

Introduction

ICON Based Application Generator

Although in many situations "a stitch in time saves
nine", it is an underestimate when it comes to
spacecraft fault management. It is well known that
a prompt fault management for a spacecraft saves
the lives of the onboard crew members. Case in
point is the dramatic 1985 explosion of the space
shuttle Challenger which indeed was preventable
if proper fault management techniques were
exercised. Complex and life critical large scale
systems (and space station is no exception) need
not generate myriad of alarms and expect the
operator or the crew members to acknowledge
them on a timely manner to prevent potential
failures. What really is needed is a systematic
fault detection, isolation and recovery scheme.

The advent of microcomputer technology along
with new developments in computer languages
have given rise to a number of highly
sophisticated intelligent controllers and work
stations that can assist the control engineer in the
design of control strategies with virtually no direct
intervention from the software engineers [7].
Although, general purpose conventional
computer languages such as Fortran, Pascal, C,
Ada, etc. have been evolved to serve a number of
disciplines, it has become evident that each
discipline has its own peculiarities. In particular
the sequential nature of conventional
programming languages does not easily lend
themself to development of control algorithms.
These facts have led the computer scientists to
develop computer languages that are more

This paper attempts to describe a methodology for t
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suitable for domain specific problems. The domain
of the problem being specific allows the computer
scientist to design the system to be data driven. A
very familiar example of a data driven system is
the spread sheet which has found enormous
popularity among nonprogrammers.
The Application Generator provides an ICON
based environment where the control engineer
can graphically represent his control strategies
and processes under control. Furthermore, the
control engineer is capable of testing and
executing his control algorithms without the
intervention of programmers. This apparent
decoupling of two disciplines results in higher
productivity and drastic reduction of cascading
faults due to hardware/software and process
interactions.
The Application Generator performs a "knowledge
capture" in this domain specific environment and
converts the result to a global database which is
used by the kernel residing in the controller
(kernel is a program that does not change even if
the process under control is modified). Steps for
this " knowledge capture" are presented next

Representation Of Process Under Control
It is clear that the process under control must be
described to the intelligent controller before the
controller takes any control action. This knowledge
includes, logical partitioning of the process under
control into a number of subprocesses, sensor
and actuator relative locations within a
subprocess, sensor and actuator characteristics,
and process variable limits. For greater efficiency
and productivity, ICONs are used extensively to
generate the graphical representation of the
process under control. Figure 1 shows the logical
partitioning of lab module simulator subsystems.
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Within the context of the Application Generator ,
the state programming is a graphical declarative
knowledge representation which allows the
control engineer to designate directly discrete
states to each subprocess within the overall
process under control. In addition, the control
engineer defines the corresponding transition
conditions. Thus, both the normal states and the
abnormal states of a subprocess are declared by
the process control engineer which gives an
"artificial consciousness" to the overall system.
This awareness enables the controller to exercise
selective actions for each given discrete state.
Furthermore, the concept is naturally suitable for
fail-safe realization of systems with stringent
reliability requirements.

Representation
strategies

Of

Process

control

The control strategies, whether logical or
analytical, must be defined for each state of a
given subprocess. For example, due to certain
failures, the system goes into an emergency state,
which may call for different order observers and a
different control law to avoid further propagation
ICON based graphical editors
of failures.
drastically reduce the huge task of data entry for
this phase of development.

The Potable Water System - An Example
This example illustrates the application of the Fault
Detection and Isolation (FDI) algorithm for the
Potable Water System (PWS) of the Space Station
using a prototype domain specific Application
Generator. On this expert process control system
four types of faults (leaky pipe, stuck valve, pump
have been
failure, and breached filter)
considered. These are crucial faults which affect
either the quality or the quantity of the potable
water reclaimed on the Space Station. An
Hp-9836 desktop computer and HP3497 data
acquisition system were used to simulate the PWS
as well as selected fault conditions which are, in
turn, monitored by the workstation.
The PWS is designed to reclaim potable water
from waste water which is produced by the crew
members and the station operation. Figure 2
depicts the Space Station PWS. It is composed of
two input waste water accumulators, one pump
module, five particle filters, one carbon filter, one
cation resin bed, one anion resin bed, two
microbials, and two output potable water storage

.
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State Programming Concept

Simulator
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XT = [X 1 ,X2 ,...,X6]T

(1)

UT=[Ull U2f U3 ]T

(2)

The discrete states are defined by two switches:
(3)

S =[81,82]
Where:

accumulators. A Water Quality Monitor (WQM)
samples the water and provides information as to
the quality of treated water.
The output of the WQM can be simply a binary
signal indicating acceptable or unacceptable
quality according to a set of values for water
quality standards. The WQM system can provide
useful information for component failure detection
purposes. The component might be the microbial,
carbon filter, or ion resin exchanger.
The PWS is operating in two modes : Mode 1 is
the filling mode when water quality is acceptable ,
while Mode 2 is called the recirculating mode
which occurs when water quality is not acceptable.
In addition the PWS has two configurations:
Configuration 1 uses the first output accumulator
as the water source while the second accumulator
is being filled. Configuration 2 uses the first
accumulator for filling and the seccnd as water
source. The decision for mode switching is a
function of the signal provided by the WQM and
conductivity sensors, while the decision for
configuration switching is a function of the level of
the output accumulators. A full complement of flow,
level, pressure, and conductivity sensors provide
information about the state of the PWS to the
intelligent controller and ultimately to the central
processor. Since Mode 1 and Mode 2 can be
operational only one at a time, the state
equations for both modes and both configurations
can be combined by introducing two switches:
Switch 1 (SO and Switch 2 (S 2 ). The switches
modify the components of the A matrix of the state
space model. The definition of the switches and
the state space representation of the PWS model
is given as:
Analog state vector:

{
{

1 —^ Mode 1 (water quality ok)
(4)

0 —*> Mode 2 (recycle)
1 —^ Output accumulator 1
is being depleted

,^

0 -^ Output accumulator 1
is being filled

The state space model of the PWS is defined by:
X =AX+BU
Where:
-JR
!f
S1
2A
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(6)
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Where:

q
If

: Flow rate of the system
: Inertia of the fluid mass

A J

PWS Fault

Detection Schemes

The goals of the Intelligent Control (1C) design are
to develop a fault detection and isolation scheme
which: (1) maximizes the sensitivity to component
failure , and (2) minimizes the* rate of the failure
detection-false alarms. Usually these two design
goals involve conflicting criteria and the 1C design
is called upon to optimize the tradeoff.
The proposed methodology exploits a
combination of signal validation techniques based
upon a parity space representation, analytic
redundancy, and artificial intelligence [1]. These
tools guarantee its sensitivity to subtle failure
modes that are transparent to most techniques.
Since the prototype Application Generator used
provides only for single-input single-output and
two-inputs single-output mathematical ICONS, It is
impossible to manipulate array arithmetic
operations and time series analysis using the
particular configuration. The proposed parity
space techniques usually involve a large number
of operations and cannot be applied in this case
due to the limitations imposed by the present state
of Application Generator technology.
The fault decision logic is simply a binary type and
the Intelligent Controller produces a status report
detailing the fault type and its location through a
color display and a speech synthesizer. The
controller finally decides as to what appropriate
control action must be taken in order to isolate the
fault and avoid a catastrophic event.
For purposes of illustrating the adopted
methodology, let us consider one of the critical
PWS fault conditions, that of a leaky pipe
segment. It is obvious that a leaky pipe may cause
severe damage to vital station components, as
well as bring about a reduction in the available
water resource. Among basic assumptions we
consider that all sensor data have been validated
with only simple faults to be detected at any time.
Furthermore, the design of the Intelligent
Controller is based upon a knowledge of the
noise bias characteristics of the sensors and the
noise and error propagation behavior of the
analytic models.
An analytic measurement is expressed as some
functional dependence on values of variables,
which are obtained from process measurements.
The latter are always
associated with
measurement uncertainties and bias errors. In
general, an analytic measurement
may be
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expressed as f(x 1 , x2 , ...,xn ). If e = [ e1 , e2,...,en ]
represents the
error
bound
vector
corresponding to the direct set of measurements
{x 1 ,x2 ,...,x n}, then , under worst case conditions,
the analytic estimate of the error threshold may be
obtained as:

E,.e af/axl+e at/ax

at/ax.

at/ax.

Or simply:

e - <£

(8)

Digital processing of data is performed by both the
Global and the Intelligent Controller, while the
actual data to the actuators and from the sensors
are analog. Analog signals must be converted to
digital form during the sampling process. Because
of the finite word length inherent in digital signal
processing, the quantized errors introduced by the
Analog to Digital conversion process can be
expressed by the following equations:
S q =(0.5) k+ 1 x100%

(9)

where:
Sq
k

: Relative quantization error
: Number of bits of the A/D device

In our particular implementation k was 11 bits
which implies a quantization error of
less than .03% which was an order of magnitude
smaller than sensor and actuator accuracies, and
therefore can be ignored without any significant
impact on the overall error threshold due to
combined sensor/actuator accuracies.
The use of error theshold for the purpose of leak
detection is described next.

Leak Detection for Pipe Segment 1
Figure 2 shows pipe segment 1 which is
represented by solid lines and cut set {A, B, C}. In
this segment F2 is a flow sensor for q2i F1 is a
flow sensor for q 1 and F4 represents q 4 . A mass
conservation principle dictates that a leak occurs
when there is a discrepancy between the net

described below.

Resistance of the system
Pressure raised by the pump
Area of the accumulator
Level of the input accumulator
Level of the output accumulator
Level of the user accumulator

R
P
A

h in
hout
h use

(1) Intelligent Controller:
The Intelligent Controller is designed to perform
the following three tasks:

Input vector U is :
: Flow rate °f ' n Put waste water

qin
u3

• Sensor data management
• Sensor data validation
• Fault detection and identification

Qref : Reference flow
q use : Flow rate of water being used

The Intelligent Controller monitors the system and
provides diagnostic messages to the maintenance
crew when a fault is detected. Also the controller
constantly minimizes the errors between the
process variables and the commanded set points.

And the states are defined as:
xi=q
x2 =h in
xs =h out

(2) Global Controller:

x4 = V (Pump motor voltage)

The Global Controller (the workstation computer)
receives the down linked signals from the
Intelligent Controller and monitors the system.
Furthermore, it performs the following tasks:

Q;(Q =
X7
The remaining coefficients are constant process
parameters. Since the transition matrix <£(A) is a
function of 81 and S2 , any change of state by
these switches will require rapid matrix inversion
(by Pade approximation of order (1,1) or namely
bilinear transformation), other multi-step
techniques such as (Runge Kutta) also require
inordinate amount of CPU time which exceeds the
computer processing power. Therefore, the
modified Euler algorithm with variable integration
time step was adopted to propagate the state
equation in real-time using an HP9836 computer.
Figure 3 depicts the control structure for the
simulation studies. The function of each block is

|
|

HAN
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Fbw Model

FV

(3) Flow Model:
The flow model simulates the dynamics of the
PWS. The model receives information about
system resistance from the water quality model.
The state space representation of this model is
given by Equation (3) which is propagated in
real-time using the HP9836 and is transmitted to
the HP3497 data acquisition system and finally to
the intelligent controller.
(4) Water Quality Model
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The water quality model simulates the flow
resistance of the PWS. Since the nominal system
flow rate is very small (in the order of micro (meter
cube)/sec), we may assume that the flow
resistance of the system is concentrated at the
particle filters. The resistance presented by piping
and other components is so small that it can be
neglected.

HPIB

Autonomous
Controller

Figure 3

The- Global Controller communicates with the
Intelligent Controller and other auxiliary
processors thru a Local Area Network.

HP-9836 Computer

Work Station
> U»n-™cf*i» IrttriK*
• Control SyOMTi Dcvctopnwn
• Apcrtcatton Gcnmaux

Irtlelllgenl Controller

ia ""^-^ p>

• Generates set points which are transmitted to
the Intelligent Controller
• Monitors the system states
• Provides Man-Machine Interface

HP-3497
Data Acquisition
and
Control
Unit
PWS Simulation

Control Structure lor Real-Time Simulation Studies
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inflow and the net outflow (the discrepancy should
be greater than the error threshold). Then, for
segment 1, we have:
Inflows:
q4 : Direct measurement of the flow sensor F4
q2 : Direct measurement of the flow sensor F2

results are shown in Figure 4. The fault detection
algorithm monitors the system at all times through
the sensor data management system. The fault
simulation module is triggered by the specific fault
introduced from the keyboard. Since the PWS is a
series configuration, the only way to isolate a
leaky pipe segment is to stop the pump and
terminate, temporarily, system operation.

Net inlfow:

Actual implementation is described next.
Implementation

(10)

QNM = 32 + 94

The commercial Application Generator used was
an ICON-1000 a product of Data Acquisition
System of Boston Mass . The work station of this
intelligent control system uses an IBM-XT with
enhanced touch sensitive display, while the
controllers are based on Motorola 68000.

Out flows:
q : Direct measurement of the flow sensor F1
qL1 : Analytic measurement of level sensor L1
qL1 = (2A)(dL1/dt)
Where
A = Area of one input accumulator
Net outflow:

qNoi

= q + qu

(11)

The overall process to be controlled is shown in
Figure 1. The PWS is a subsystem within the
overall lab module simulator and it is logically
partitioned into 5 subprocesses. These

02)

Applying the conservation law to find discrepancy:

l<fe + q4 - q - qu I

H2O Flow rate (10 A -6)(m A 3)/sec
H2O Usage

0 3)

(10A-6)(m A 3)/sec

• Output Storage §1 Level (0.1)(m)
- Output Storage 92 Level (0.1)(fn'

The measurement error associated with the above
equations can be derived as the maximum error
criterion. For maximum flow , q f is the nominal
flow, i.e. 1.82 litters/hour, then:
Aqd1 1 .82 x 0.1 x 4 =0.0073 litters/hour

(1 4)

As it is pointed out earlier, the uncertainty analysis
was not implemented due to the limitations
imposed by the prototype Application Generator.
For binary decision without false alarming, the
measurement error (reasonable tolerance level) is
taken as 0.15 litters/hour (from the simulation
results) which is considered to be the threshold for
all leaky pipes.
Now we can state the decision rule for fault in
segment 1:
If qd1 > 0.15 litters/hour, then pipe segment 1 is
leaky
If qd1 < 0.15 litters/hour, then pipe segment 1 is
not leaky
Similar procedures are used to define faults in
other pipe segments. Typical FDI simulation

9-68

TIME

(MINUTES)

Figure 40 PWS State variable evolution

subprocess are grouped inside the dashed box
labeled PWS. Due to space limitations only the
OUT_ACCU (output accumulators) subprocess
will be described here. This subprocess is
expanded in Figure 5. Similarly all of the
remaining 15 subprocess are expanded, (but are
not shown here). The expanded subprocesses
show the component interaction and
sensor-actuator location. The corresponding state
diagram for each subprocess is entered next.
Figure 6 depicts the states of the OUt-ACCU
subprocess. The MAINTAIN state is fail-safe state
where the operator is notified about the nature of
the problem. The transition definition from
NORMAL to MAINTAIN is shown in Figure 7.

POINT ID

H PUB: IM»-flCCU

n wi MIX 11 wt5~]
BINDINGS

Select a physical point to configure.

||

Figure 5

no

INP-ACCU Subprocesa Expnaded

case the Potable Water System of the Space
Station's common module - the control strategies
associated with the subsystem as well as the fault
management techniques. The utility of . the
approach is demonstrated with the PWS example.
Obvious advantage of the Application Generator
include increased design flexibility and reliability.
The study has also revealed some disadvantages
of existing technology referring primarily to the
limited availability of tools for representing
large-scale dynamic systems which, in turn, limits
considerably the application domain. Future efforts
must focus on the development of more powerfull
state machines capable of expanding their domain
of applications within the specific domain of
process control.
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